Waiting for bad news on the edge of another crisis

Not a great beginning of the week for the world economy. The week has started with more rumors about a Greek default, doubts on the French banks, weakness of the Euro and sharp falls in European stock markets during the first half of the day. Another recession? The beginning of a depression? We are going through a period of fatigue as markets, investors, companies seem to be waiting for good news coming from any of the advanced economies. But we only get bad news. Governments and central banks try to cheer us up: President Obama with a plan to create jobs, the ECB buying government bonds from Spain and Italy and keeping their rates under control, but none of this is enough, we need much more to reverse the current decline in confidence. 

We have lived under the hope that as long as the news were not too bad, that we would over time build the necessary confidence to generate healthy growth. As long as we can keep going without Greece defaulting, with US fiscal policy on automatic pilot even if there is no exit plan, with unemployment rate not going up in the US (even if it stayed high), we could find the necessary arguments to start spending and investing again. Now we know that this is not going to work. As time passes confidence gets weaker and we enter a vicious cycle of expectations causing behavior that feeds into our pessimism. Fundamentals have not changed much but we are waiting for a signal that although things are not that great but they are not that bad either and in the absence of that signal, we assume the worst.

It is not easy to see what positive signal we will get over the next weeks. I cannot imagine any GDP, unemployment, consumption, earnings release that will be good enough to reverse the current mood. Will the approval of the Obama jobs plan by congress be good enough? I doubt it. Will a new statement by the Euro countries that no government will be allowed to default do the trick? I do not think so. We need a surprise, something that is not part of any of the current scenarios we are contemplating. And whatever that surprise is, it needs to do something substantial to stimulate demand in the short term. Yes, structural reforms will always be welcome but there is the need for actions in the short term and promises of a better distant future will not be enough. What I would like to see is a strong statement by economic authorities among all advanced economies that they understand the situation, that they clearly share the same priorities, that they all see that we are in the same boat and that austerity for the sake of austerity is not the solution to the current crisis. 

But such an announcement requires a lot of political consensus within countries and internationally, which is not what we have seen in the last days. And it also requires more clarity from central banks in their communications. While Bernanke and Trichet have done lots of great things to avoid a deeper recession, their most recent communications (e.g. Trichet responding to a question about the ECB and Germany) reveals too much the tension in their decision making process and not enough their commitment to find a solution.

Antonio Fatás

Interest rates should go up... or maybe down (OECD)

April 5 2011:

The OECD said central bankers increasingly need to focus on tackling inflation as the economic recovery takes root in major economies, adding that some of its members faced the risk of inflation becoming "un-anchored." 

"We see inflationary expectations creeping upwards a bit everywhere, I would say, in Europe, in the United States, in the UK," OECD chief economist Pier Carlo Padoan said in an interview with Reuters. 

"Central banks should keep inflation expectations under control," he said.

Today (September 8, 2011):

“Growth is turning out to be much slower than we thought three months ago, and the risk of hitting patches of negative growth going forward has gone up,” OECD Chief Economist Pier Carlo Padoan said during a presentation of the OECD’s latest Interim Economic Assessment.

The OECD recommends that central banks keep policy rates at present levels, and barring signs of recovery, consider lowering rates when there is scope.

Maybe we were too optimistic about the strength of the recovery few months ago... (Brad DeLong makes a similar point in this post).

Antonio Fatás

Let's increase interest rates to encourage credit growth

Since I read this article in yesterday's Financial Times from Bill Gross I have been searching all my macroeconomics books for a model that explain the logic of the article. I have not found it yet. I am glad that I am not teaching a macroeconomics course now because I do not know what I would answer if my students asked me to explain the logic of the article...

The argument is that Ben Bernanke has destroyed credit creation in the US by making the yield curve flatter in the 0-2 years horizon (and he did this with his statement that Federal Funds rate will be zero for the next two years). According to the article, the flattening of the yield curve reduces lending by banks because it reduces the potential return to banks of borrowing short term and lending at a two year horizon.

I understand that a strong recovery is normally associated with an upward slopping yield curve and the fact that we have a flat curve is bad news. But by committing to keep short term interest rates low for an extended period of time, the Fed is providing incentives for banks and investors to move into riskier assets (lending to companies, consumers) within that horizon. This should create lending, nor destroy it. This is what a macroeconomics textbook says (including the one written by Ben Bernanke). Reducing Fed rates does not change per se the returns of investment in other assets, it just makes the differential with the riskless asset even larger and creates an incentive to borrow/lend. There are many yield curves, one for each class of asset and the Fed policy can only influence (directly) the one associated to riskless assets.

Of course, it can be that Ben Bernanke's action changed our expectations of the future and we are now more pessimistic than before so lending will be destroyed after all, but this is not a direct consequence of lower interest rates but of the management of expectations.

Antonio Fatás

Two examples of gaps in Macroeconomics

Much has been said about the failure of Macroeconomics (and macroeconomists) to explain, predict or find solutions for the last financial crisis and its aftermath. The topic came back to my mind after reading two recent articles about current macroeconomic events, articles that capture well some of the gaps of the academic economics literature. 

The first article is by Robert Shiller in The New York Times. Robert Shiller is well known for his work around excesses in financial markets. He has produced many interesting pieces of academic work on this subject but he is better known to the public for his book Irrational Exuberance about the asset price bubble during the 90s as well as his warnings on the real estate bubble prior to the collapse in 2007. His article discusses recent volatility in the stock market in terms of the "beauty contest" analogy suggested by Keynes. His view of markets is one of volatility and behavior which is more about predicting what others do than understanding the fundamental value of assets. The article presents a view of stock markets which might not be far from what many (investors, those involved in financial markets, the general public) believe about those markets. But it is not the view that most macroeconomic or financial models have of how investors behave. Yes, we have models that try to capture some of the anomalies and volatile behavior described by Robert Shiller, but these models have very limited influence when it comes to macroeconomic analysis or advise for policy makers. Erratic and volatile behavior in financial markets and asset prices can be a source of volatility for the economy, lead to unsustainable behavior (bubbles) and make the recovery from those events much harder because of how pessimism spreads through trade and interactions among investors. Ignoring this behavior makes it impossible to talk about the most recent business cycles.

The second article is from Brad DeLong and it talks about what to do with the US labor market. This is another area where macroeconomic models struggle to deal with current events, in particular the very negative labor market that the US economy has had for the last three years. And in this case it is not because the labor market was not part of macroeconomic models. All macroeconomic models include a labor market and they discuss the issue of unemployment. But their discussions are not too helpful in understanding the current US environment. Most macroeconomic models have a view of labor markets clearing around a certain unemployment rate (structural unemployment, natural rate of unemployment,...). Some models only generate movements in unemployment when the equilibrium level changes - but it is hard to argue that this is what we have witnessed since 2007. Other talk about cyclical unemployment caused by frictions. But there is no agreement on the origin of these frictions. In the standard New-Keynesian model, frictions come mostly from price rigidity. These frictions are temporary and as time passes unemployment returns to its natural value. But as Brad DeLong correctly argues:

"Excess supply on the labor market not is registering at all, is not leading to any upward pressure on the rate of matching workers who want jobs with jobs that want workers. We have an awful lot of people who are answering the CPS survey by saying; "No, I don’t have a job, and yes, I have done something to look for one over the past four weeks". Your most basic economic matching model says: multiply the fraction of workers looking for jobs by the fraction of jobs looking for workers and that will b proportional to your job-finding rate. It isn't. The equilibrium-restoring forces in the labor market at the macro level appear to be much much weaker than I thought they were in 2007, appear much weaker than I would have believed back in 2007 that they possibly could be."

As a final point, and to be fair to the academic literature, there are plenty of models that incorporate volatile or irrational behavior in financial markets and there are many models that include a variety of frictions in the labor market that could account for some of what we see today. But these features are not at the core of the standard analysis of the current macroeconomic environment and they are not articulated in a way that allows for concrete and specific policy advise. And those who dare using some of these features in their analysis and policy recommendations seem to do it mostly when talking to "outsiders" and less so in conversations with other academics. 

Antonio Fatás

News or Noise?

I always find it amusing to read headlines from the business press (and their web sites) regarding macroeconomic news. In particular, headlines about exchange rates many times refer to dramatic movements in currency prices. No doubt that some currencies are very volatile and there is room to talk about interesting changes affecting exchange rates, but it also seems the case that most of these headlines do not correspond to what one sees in the data. Days were there is very little movements in exchange rates produce headlines such as "Dollar tumbles" or "Euro falls sharply".

As an illustration, I have collected headlines regarding the US dollar / Euro exchange rate for the last thirteen days (source CNBC.com). What we see is a succession of headlines (and stories) that talk about dramatic upward and downward movements of this exchange rate. There are days where one can even get three headlines on this subject, each of them pointing in a different direction. The list of headlines is below, together with a plot of what the Euro/Dollar exchange rate did during those days. Interestingly, despite the dramatic tone of the headlines the exchange rate was very stable moving in a range 1.4350 to 1.4500 (which is a fairly narrow range for this exchange rate).

List of headlines (CNBC.com)



Fears of weak global economy helps support dollar 
Thursday, 18 August 2011 10:51 PM ET

FOREX OUTLOOK-Dollar drops but respite in sight if economy dims 

Friday, 19 August 2011 11:25 PM ET

FOREX-Fed speculation hurts dollar vs high-yielders, euro 

Monday, 22 August 2011 3:32 PM ET 

Dollar wavers as stocks jump on lack of bad news 

Monday, 22 August 2011 5:32 PM ET

FOREX-Euro edges up on German data, hopes for Fed easing 

Tuesday, 23 August 2011 5:57 PM ET

Dollar Slides as Investors Look to Fed Move 

Tuesday, 23 August 2011 10:26 PM ET

Dollar Gains on Stock Selloff, Bets on Bernanke Speech 

Thursday, 25 August 2011 10:31 PM ET 

FOREX-Dollar slips vs euro, yen ahead of Bernanke speech 

Friday, 26 August 2011 3:30 PM ET

Dollar gains strength after Bernanke speech 

Friday, 26 August 2011 4:50 PM ET

FX OUTLOOK-Dollar tumbles after Bernanke; U.S. jobs data ahead 

Friday, 26 August 2011 11:30 PM ET

Euro Held Up by Asian Banks 

Monday, 29 August 2011 1:30 AM ET

Dollar Slips, Poland Talks Tough 

Monday, 29 August 2011 3:21 PM ET 

FOREX-Dollar rises vs franc, yen as US recession fears fall 

Monday, 29 August 2011 6:56 PM ET

Bernanke speech weighs on dollar in thin trading 

Monday, 29 August 2011 7:41 PM ET 

Dollar Rises vs Franc, Yen and Franc Fall on US Data 

Monday, 29 August 2011 8:37 PM ET

Dollar to Hit $1.50 to Euro? 

Monday, 29 August 2011 10:17 PM ET

Euro Falls Sharply on Euro Zone Debt Worries 

Tuesday, 30 August 2011 2:47 PM ET

Source: Oanda.com

Antonio Fatás

Yields for some Euro government bonds falling fast

A move in the opposite direction would have made it to the headlines of all financial newspapers but, just in case you missed it, here are the yields on 10-year government bonds for Ireland and Spain. They are still high relative to where they were before the crisis but they have been falling very fast over the last weeks. Some of this fall has to do with lower interest rates everywhere else (so the spread with the German yields has not fallen as much as what you see in these figures), but from the perspective of sustainability of government debt what matters is the interest rate you pay on your bonds and not the differential with a safe asset. 

Spain 10-Year Government Bonds

Ireland 10-Year Government Bonds

Antonio Fatás

Mind the ($5.1 Trillion) Gap

The debate between whether governments should focus on helping the economy grow faster or imposing discipline and austerity in their budgets is not going away. No one disagrees with the statement that governments needs to find ways to bring discipline to fiscal policy. Given current policies, governments are on an unsustainable path and there is a need for reform that will require a combination of lower spending and additional source of revenues.

The debate is on whether there is also a need to increase economic activity via expansionary fiscal policy (which in the short run is likely to make the deficit bigger). Not every country is in the same situation so it is difficult to provide an answer that is valid for every economy, but here are the two principles that should not be forgotten in this debate:

1. Bringing sustainability to public finances is about ensuring sound fiscal policy over the coming decades, not months. For many of the advanced economies, the future deficits look worse than the accumulated debt. Putting fiscal policy on a sustainable path requires reforms that should be long lasting, and we are talking about decades, not quarters. The difference between implementing these reforms in 2011 or 2013 is insignificant compared to the challenge that governments face. What matters is the commitment to get it right in the long run, not now. Yes, what governments do today could be a signal of what they will do over the coming decades, but this is only true up to a point. There will be new governments in the coming years and what is really required is not a contractionary budget one year but a structure and a set of constraints that ensures discipline for future governments.

2. The need for additional fiscal stimulus is based on the assumption that we are not in a normal year. If unemployment was at a normal level, if the output gap was zero (output was equal to potential), then there is no reason to postpone the necessary adjustment. But there is a dimension of economic policy (both monetary and fiscal) that works towards the stabilization of the business cycle. We do not expect monetary policy or fiscal policy to be the same in a recession than in an expansion. And while fiscal policy might require to show discipline over the coming decades, the amount of discipline should be different depending on the phase of the business cycle. Letting the economy be producing below potential for a long number of years is not only socially costly but it leads to a permanent loss in output which is a potential source of tax revenues.  And the most recent projections from the CBO (Congressional Budget Office) in the US show that GDP will be significantly below potential output for about 8 years, from 2008 to 2015 (see image below, source).

If we accumulate the output gap for all these years we are talking about a $5.1 Trillion gap that represents a permanent loss in output (and income, and tax revenues). Some might see this as a natural and unavoidable adjustment which almost amounts to claim that GDP and potential output are identical, the output gap is zero, unemployment is all structural. But given that the US economy has a strong tendency to return to its trend regardless of economic shocks, it is difficult to argue that there is no output gap to be filled in 2011 (or any other year before we get to 2015). 

Antonio Fatás