Monday, April 6, 2009
Bubbles and Systemic Risk
Whether a bubble will develop or not in the immediate future is not entirely clear. In this entry, however, I want to use these concerns in order to put up two topics for discussion: (1) Not all bubbles are the same; (2) The big issue is systemic risk – with or without bubbles.
1. Not all bubbles are born equal. The fact that a bubble may develop does not necessarily mean that we will get to the same catastrophic dynamics as in the past two years. Suppose that a bubble develops in the market for gold and the price goes to $3000 per ounce. At some point investors may realize that demand is faltering, they will start selling their holdings of gold and the bubble will deflate. Although for some investors the collapse of this bubble will generate uncomfortable redistribution of wealth, it is not going to lead necessarily to a financial meltdown. Even the dot.com bubble did not generate the same kind of dynamics as the ones we saw after 2007. The gold bubble and the dot.com bubble are very different from the house price bubble. In my view, the key distinction is whether the bursting of the bubble generates systemic risk for the banking sector. One of the fundamental reasons for the severity of the current recession is that credit markets froze because banks had too much uncertainty about their survival probability and they stopped lending. In plain words, the collapse of the bubble had implications for the entire economic and financial system. Not all bubbles have such effects.
Inevitably, there will be more bubbles in the future. There is little doubt that euphoria in some markets at some point will lead to a disconnect between fundamental values and current prices. Whether policy makers should address a bubble and by what means depends to a large degree on the risk of having an economy-wide meltdown once the bubble starts deflating.
2. From regulation to systemic risk policy? The dynamics of the vicious circle between the contraction of the real economy and the disintegration of the financial sector is reminiscent of the dynamics that led to the severity of the Great Depression. Roosevelt arrested these dynamics by implementing four policy changes: (1) financial restructuring (after the banking holiday); (2) expansionary monetary policy (allowed by the suspension of the gold standard); (3) fiscal expansion (i.e. the New Deal; I know that it had a small contribution to the recovery, but at least fiscal policy was not in the way of other policies); (4) regulatory changes (the Glass-Steagall act, etc.). Since the start of the toxic interaction between the financial collapse and the real economy contraction after the collapse of Lehman brothers, I have argued that policy makers have to act in the same four dimensions in order to stabilize the economic activity. This is hardly an original thought, but it is useful to remember that these were also the actions of the Roosevelt government.
At an event organized by INSEAD on April 3, 2009, I made the same argument and in a panel discussion after my presentation, Sir Andrew Large – a former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England – suggested that there is a fifth item that should be added to this list: policy related to systemic risk.
So far systemic risk has been in the realm of regulation. We can think of various restrictions on lending, leverage, capital adequacy ratios, etc., which are designed to minimize the risk of a system-wide collapse. The point of Sir Andrew Large was that these are static measures, but given the sharp increase in financial innovation and the rapid changes in financial markets, shouldn’t we think of a policy body that continuously reviews and changes some of these ratios on a dynamic basis? In the way that monetary policy changes interest rates, the new policy authority will have a set of instruments to deal with developments that raise systemic risk in the economy. Naturally, this body will be in charge of addressing bubbles that have systemic implications. However, it will not be just a bubble-buster, since systemic risk can arise even in periods without bubbles.
There are certainly pros and cons in implementing such a dramatic institutional change and I am sure that I do not do justice here to the ideas of Sir Andrew Large. But I think that this is a very original idea and it deserves further consideration.
Ilian Mihov
Thursday, April 2, 2009
The Euro area is (was) officially in a recession (in case you did not know)
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
The stock market and the value of the US dollar

Friday, March 27, 2009
A stronger role for the IMF in times of crisis
- increase in the amount of lending that countries can obtain from the IMF
- additional flexibility in the terms of the loan as well as the lending processes
- loans are conditional on pre-qualification criteria rather than ex-post outcomes (this is probably one of the most significant changes as these conditions were many times seen as unnecessary impositions on domestic economic policy
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Yet another paradox of thrift
The global nature of the current recession is clearly a consequence of the increases in trade and capital flows that we had witnessed in previous decades. But, more importantly, it is also a reminder that imbalances (such as current account imbalances) always have two sides. When adjustments are needed they require changes not only in countries with deficits but also in those with surpluses. In fact, under some circumstances, the changes can be as dramatic for those who were seen as the cause of the problem (the countries with a deficit) than for those who seemed to be doing everything right.
Here is the intuition: Let’s split the world into countries with current account deficits (the ”spenders” (US)) and countries with current account surpluses (the “producers” (Germany, Japan, China)). The countries with deficits were, of course, financing their excess spending by borrowing from those who had a surplus. At some point, the countries with a deficit realize that they are not as rich as they thought and they are forced to cut their spending. They were the ones with a problem, with an imbalance to solve but what happens to the “producers”?Clearly they will see the demand falling for their products (their exports). What is interesting is that, under some circumstances, they might see a drop in GDP which is as large as the countries that “were in trouble”. In fact, and what might look like a contradiction, it is likely that the larger the initial imbalance, the more the countries with a surplus will suffer, in terms of GDP (think about an extreme case where the spending countries do not produce anything, all the fall in GDP will happen in the producing countries). So for the countries with large current account surpluses, their apparent position of strength before the crisis has turned against them when the crisis takes place and they might see larger drops in GDP than the countries that started with a deficit. In addition, if their exports were in goods that are highly cyclical (durable goods, cars, equipment, IT), the effect can be even more dramatic, and this is an important factor for Japan, Germany or some of the Asian exporters. Finally, how much of the necessary adjustment of spending in the US will fall on imports versus domestic goods will be a function of the exchange rate.
In summary, generating current account surpluses and accumulating reserves as protection against the possibility of a future crisis cannot be seen as a a guarantee against a global recession, especially if it is caused by the need to adjust global imbalances. The accumulated savings will serve as a buffer to avoid a fall in domestic spending but we might still see a significant slowdown in GDP growth or even a recession.
Antonio Fatás
Friday, March 20, 2009
CNBC Interview on monetary policy
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Euro countries: missing their old currencies? Maybe not.
The current financial crisis is the first real test that the Euro area has faced since its launch in January 1999. While the idea of sharing one currency sounds very good from the perspective of lowering transaction costs and uncertainty, it comes with a cost. There is always the fear that individual members will not be able to cope with recessions as they have lost their ability to decide on their monetary policy (and the exchange rate).
GDP Growth Rates
Spain Euro 2008 1.2 1.0 2009 -1.7 -2.0 2010 -0.1 0.2
GDP Growth Rates
UK | |
2008 | 0.7 |
2009 | -2.8 |
2010 | 0.2 |
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook
Finally, if Spain still had their own currency and the currency had depreciated, we would have likely observed two very damaging outcomes in financial markets. First, the Spanish government as well as some of the Spanish multinational companies and banks would have seen their foreign-denominated liabilities explode because of the depreciation of the Peseta (as it is likely that they would have been borrowing in foreign currencies in previous years). In addition, when issuing new debt Spain would have faces a much higher interest rate. The Spanish government is already facing today an interest rate that is about one percentage point above the one, faced by the German government. This is all because of the fear of default; there is no uncertainty with respect to the value of the currency (both of them are denominated in Euros). If the bonds were denominated in the Spanish currency, it is very plausible that this differential would be even higher.
So having the King of Spain (or the Queen of England) printed on your bank notes is, for some, a strong sign of independence and of your ability to decide on your own destiny. But how much can a depreciation of these pictures of the King or the Queen help us getting out of a recession is much less obvious when one looks at the data.
Antonio Fatás